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Introduction
Alex Barber
Because it has no established usage, the phrase ‘epistemology of language’
can suggest any of a number of di·erent agendas. But speaking broadly,
there seem to be two levels at which epistemology bears on language.
First there is what might be called ‘the discipline level’. We need to
make decisions on how to investigate the phenomena of language. How
to describe these phenomena? What questions are worth asking of them?
What avenues of enquiry aremost likely to bear fruit?Whatmethodologies
are best suited to these investigations, now or in the foreseeable future?
These are epistemological decisions in roughly the sense that any decisions
in the philosophy of science are epistemological, the scientiﬁc discipline in
this case being linguistics.
Second there is what might be called ‘the language-user level’. We are
speakers and understanders of language ourselves, able to communicate,
to be expressive, and to reason using language. An interest in how such
achievements are humanly possible is epistemological in the same sense
that an interest in, say, our capacity to come to know facts about the
physical objects around us through perception is epistemological.
Epistemology of language is characterized by epistemic concerns that
recur across a broad range of areas other than language. Through reﬂec-
tion on these concerns in a speciﬁcally linguistic context we can hope to
learn as much about knowledge as about language. At the language-user
Thanks to JonathanKnowles,BenShaer, and individualauthors,particularlyRobStainton,
for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this introduction. Responsibility for any errors
remains my own.
 Whether a scientiﬁc approach to language is appropriate is itself a question many
would wish to pitch at the discipline level. I shall speak indiscriminately of the philosophy
of language and linguistics except where it is obvious from the context that I am talking
of distinct traditions.
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level this is borne out—to take just one example—by changes in thinking
about unconscious and innate knowledge, changes that have sprung from
work that has had linguistic knowledge at its heart. And these changes at
the language-user level have taken place only because of parallel develop-
ments at the discipline level: attributions of innate knowledge of language
are called for only if one accepts the poverty-of-the-stimulus methodology
that is standardly used to motivate them. More generally, those contribu-
tions to the philosophy of science that have come with the progress of the
cognitive sciences, including linguistics as a paradigm case, bear witness to
ongoing interaction between language and epistemology at the discipline
level. Another example of such interaction is also a pressing methodologi-
cal consideration: do appeals to intuitions, and the associated method of
thought experimentation (e.g. concerning reference and meaning), have a
place alongsidemore orthodox experimental methods, and if so what place
is that?
The sixteen contributors to this volume engage with a variety of que-
sitons, posed at both levels. Some have chosen to work towards settling
disagreements that have been in place for decades or more, disagreements
that are as critical now as they have ever been. Others take the epistemology
of language into newer areas that are likely to deﬁne the ﬁeld in years to
come. Each chapter can be read and understood in isolation, but in this
introduction I outline the authors’ ambitions and the context in which
their contributions are made. I have divided the papers into four sections:
‘Knowledge in Linguistics’; ‘Understanding’; ‘Linguistic Externalism’; and
‘Epistemology through Language’.
1 Knowledge in Linguistics
The two levels of epistemology of language just distinguished are welded
together in the claims, associated with the work of Noam Chomsky and
others, that:
 Laurence andMargolis (2001) provide an opinionated survey of debates over poverty-
of-the-stimulus argumentation. I return to the topic of unconscious knowledge below in
connection with Searle (1990).
 See e.g. Chomsky (1986), 4.3 for (i) and ch. 1 for (ii). Chomsky’s most developed state-
ment and discussion of the ground and implications of these two claims—including cer-
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(i) ordinary language users possess structures of knowledge, reasonably
so called, of a complex system of rules or principles of language,
and that
(ii) the core part of a scientiﬁc (‘naturalistic’) approach to the study
of language should consist of an attempt to render this knowledge
explicit.
The proposal is not that ordinary speakers are like professional linguists in
the manner in which they arrive at or deploy this knowledge. But linguistic
theories, on this conception of linguistics, are nevertheless to be understood
as the explicit statement of certain aspects of the content of knowledge states
possessed by ordinary speakers. The papers in Part One are all concerned
with this conceptualist understanding of linguistics, as it has come to be
known. Debate over conceptualism in this sense has turned on what kind
of knowledge linguistic knowledge is, if indeed it is any kind of knowledge,
and on what goals might be proper to linguistics other than or in addition
to that of rendering explicit the content of states of linguistic knowledge.
Conceptualismoften serves as thedefault conceptionmany linguists have
of the project they are engaged in. Particularly among syntacticians and
semanticists, the answer to the question ‘What are your theories theories
of ?’ is that they are being put forward as explicit statements of knowledge
possessed by individual speakers, knowledge that by hypothesis plays some
pivotal role in these individuals’ overt capacity to use language in the way
they do. Conceptualism is now also fairly widespread among those whose
background is primarily in the philosophy of language.
But conceptualism is far from achieving hegemony. This can be put down
in part to the vociferousness of its sceptics. Some of these sceptics are unwill-
tain qualiﬁcations to my raw statement of them—can be found in the essays in Chomsky
(2000). There are several collections that, unlike the present one, are dedicated speciﬁc-
ally to the assessment of Chomsky’s contributions to philosophy and linguistics: Harman
(1974); George (1989b); Kasher (1991); Antony and Hornstein (2003); and McGilvray
(forthcoming). Radford (1997) gives an introduction to the technicalities of Chomskian
syntax from the minimalist perspective favoured at least since Chomsky (1995b).
 The label is not an entirely happy one since the knowledge is held by many ‘con-
ceptualists’ to be non-conceptual, non-intentional, and subdoxastic. But it has had wide
currency since being introduced by Jerrold Katz (in Katz 1990 and elsewhere), so I shall
stick with it throughout this introduction.
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ing to accept that ordinary speakers have knowledge of the kind standardly
attributed to them by linguists; others are happy with this in principle,
but do not think that explicating this knowledge is what linguists have or
should have as their primary concern. (‘Scepticism’ is thus a doubly appro-
priate term here since it can operate at both the language-user level and
the discipline level.) Equally signiﬁcant is the persistence of disagreements
within the conceptualist camp concerning what kind of knowledge is being
imputed to speakers, with some holding back from calling the relevant
psychological state ‘knowledge’ at all, preferring to talk of representation
or cognition.
The schismatic character of the conceptualist church originates in the va-
riety of objections to the unadorned statement of conceptualism I provided
above. Each objection gives rise to di·erent responses and qualiﬁcations.
Objections can be distinguished according to whether they threaten (i) or
just (ii). The ﬁrst three papers of Part One are concerned with objections
to (ii) alone, the ﬁnal two with objections to (i) (and hence (ii)).upsilonaspertilde I shall
consider them in this order.
Those who deny that linguistics is or should be concerned to reveal the
knowledge states of ordinary speakers normally have some non-conceptual-
ist understanding of the goals of linguistics ready to hand as an alternative.
One such alternative is Platonism, named as such and defended by Jerrold
J. Katz. Katz takes the main objective of linguistics to be the description of
languages, thought of as abstract entities akin to the abstract structures of
mathematics. The task of describing the partial cognitive grasp we have of
theseobjects falls, not to linguistics, but topsycholinguistics.Linguistics is not
 A spectrum of positions have been adopted. Knowles (2000) argues for treating the
relation as one of straightforward knowledge-that. Dwyer and Pietroski (1996) argue it
is belief but not knowledge. Chomsky (1980), 91, claims that it is more like knowledge
than belief. Others hold that it is neither knowledge nor belief but something we can
construct from scratch (see in particular a long-running debate from Wright’s criticism
(1986b) of Evans (1981), the replies in Davies (1987), Peacocke (1986), Davies (1989), and
Peacocke (1989),with useful complementary discussion and criticism in George (1989a),
Miller (1997), and Antony (1997). Some constructions of the relation between linguistic
theories (especially semantic ones) and speakers are, however, not conceptualist at all but
more or less instrumentalist: Foster (1976); Sainsbury (1980); Fricker (1983); and, again,
Wright (1986b) (on which see Antony 1997).
upsilonaspertilde Some authors, e.g. Devitt and Sterelny (1987), reject (i) on certain readings, but hold
that even if these objections fail there are independent reasons for rejecting (ii).
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even an empirical discipline.To assumeotherwisewould be akin to claiming
that mathematics could be studied using the methods of psychology.
Conceptualists have replied that our interest in these abstract objects
resides wholly in the fact that they are abstractions from the minds of
individual speakers. What other point could there be to studying them?
Unlike mathematical facts, which are distinct from our knowledge of those
facts, ‘pure’ linguistic facts seem to be pointless abstracta. This charge is
borne out, they add, by the observation that what Katz calls ‘linguistics’
bears little relation to what goes on in linguistics departments, which seem
to practise what he calls ‘psycholinguistics’.
The ﬁrst two contributions in Part One were written a few years earlier
than the others in this collection and have been revised to appear in print
here for the ﬁrst time. Both seek to apply morals drawn from elsewhere
in the philosophy of science to the speciﬁc case of linguistics, with a view
to defending conceptualism against Scott Soames (Chapter 2) and against
Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny (Chapter 3).
Soames di·ers from Katz in holding that linguistics is an empirical disci-
pline; yet like Katz he argues that linguistics does (or should) aim to describe
the properties of languages or expressions, properties that are to a degree
independent of facts about individual speakers: ‘there are linguistics facts
that are non-psychological in nature’, with semantic properties in particu-
lar being dependent on ‘extra-psychological notions’.upsilonasperacute Moreover, there are
‘psychological facts [about linguistic competence] that are non-linguistic’,
having to do with speed or order of processing and the like. From this he
concludes that linguistics—the attempt to uncover these linguistic facts—
is an enterprise conceptually distinct from anything that can be called a
 Katz (1990; 1996). Apart from conceptualism and Platonism, Katz gives the label
‘nominalism’ to those performance-ﬁxated conceptions of the goal of linguistics that are
widely regarded as having preceded the cognitive revolution, as criticized in, for example,
Chomsky (1959).
 See Fodor (1981) and George (1996). Devitt and Sterelny (1989) agree with the
criticism (pp. 515–16) but not with the inference to conceptualism.
upsilonasperacute Soames (1984), 163. Soames seems to have in mind the thought that an individual
can be mistaken about the correctness conditions on utterances in her or his language,
conditions that are determined by facts about the community and/or by facts about the
physical world. An earlier and briefer criticism of Soames (1984) than that provided by
Antony in ch. 2 below can be found in Chomsky (1986), 34–6. Both Soames and Katz are
criticized in Higginbotham (1983). For Soames on Katz, see Soames (1991).
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branch of psychology. Linguistic theories are nevertheless empirical, since
although they ‘abstract away from potential di·erences in the internal rep-
resentations and computational routines of various mental systems’, they
do so ‘in order to concentrate on the structure of the common output they
all produce’, a structure that can only be revealed empirically.
Louise M. Antony (Chapter 2) accuses Soames of applying to linguistics
standards that are manifestly inappropriate when applied in other scientiﬁc
domains. At ﬁrst glance, she says, Soames appears to be guilty of trying to
specify a priori what kinds of evidence can bear on linguistics, and inferring
from this speciﬁcation that linguistics is only about facts belonging to the
domains that areevidentially relevant to it. If thatwerehispoint, hewouldbe
overlooking the fact that evidence is holistic: there is potential for discoveries
inonediscipline tobear evidentiallyonpuzzles in someapparentlyunrelated
ﬁeld. She concedes that Soames is not making this mistake. But he is, she
says, relying on a related claim: that one can distinguish between evidence
that bears on a discipline in such a way as to deﬁne the ambitions of that
discipline, and other evidence that, though it bears on the discipline, does
so in a non-constitutive way. The example that gives her contribution its
title is designed to show up the error of this way of thinking.
Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny regard language as a human product,
but not one that is a ‘characteristic of the human mind’. Although (contra
Katz) linguistics will be an empirical discipline, it will not be so because
the facts of linguistics are a proper subclass of the facts of psychology. But
(contra Soames) their main argument for this conclusion does not turn on
an a priori claim aboutwhat the facts are that linguists must uncover, where
these turn out to be distinct from the facts of psycholinguistics. Rather, it
develops froma kind of discipline-sized principle of charity: ‘Thebest reason
thatwe can expect to ﬁnd for thinking that linguistics is about x rather than y
is that the considerations and evidence that have guided the construction of
linguistic theory justify our thinking that the theory is true about x but not
y.’
 By this criterion, they continue, linguists cannot be taken at their word

 Devitt and Sterelny (1989), 498–9. See also Devitt and Sterelny (1987), ch. 8, and
other articles cited by Laurence (in ch. 3 below). Related discussion can be found in
Wiggins (1997) and Millikan (2003), both of whom argue that the notion of a language
that is more than an abstraction from the mind/brain of an individual speaker has a place
beyond folk linguistics.
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when they say they are concerned with uncovering innate structures that
underpin our competence. Devitt and Sterelny instead attribute to linguists
an ambition to identify the syntactic and semantic properties of ‘symbols’,
which are ‘parts of the physical world’. These properties are the ones
by virtue of which symbols are able to ‘have their roles in our lives’, most
notably their communicative role. Linguistics will be an empirical discipline
with psychological aspects, but not a wholly psychological discipline.
According to Stephen Laurence (Chapter 3), the criterion Devitt and
Sterelny appeal to is ﬂawed. As a reductio, Laurence applies the criterion to
the practice of developing what actually is intended to be a psycholinguistic
theory (a theory backed up by claims about reaction times). Once again,
the result is that the theories arrived at would not count as a branch of
psychology. Laurence concludes that to accept the criterion would be to
endorse bad philosophy of science, since it is a criterion that yields absurd
results when applied in other contexts.
InChapter 4MichaelDevitt develops the alternative theory of the aims of
linguistics outlined in his earlier workwith Sterelny and summarized above.
Drawing analogies between linguistic competence and the competence of
chess players, logic machines, and dancing bees, Devitt defends the thought
that there is a linguistic reality that is distinct from any psychological reality
in speakers. Anticipating various charges that have been levelled against
similar-sounding views, he insists that this linguistic reality does not collapse
into facts about performance; and though the structure of this reality is
characterized by rules, these need not be represented, or otherwise present,
in themind of speakers. Atmostwe can say that the competence of speakers
to speak a languagemust ‘respect’ the rules of that language. He also claims
to be going beyond Katz (1990) and Soames (1984) in arguing not only
for the conceptual distinctness of linguistic facts from psychological facts,
but also for our having a legitimate theoretical interest in uncovering these
linguistic facts.
Turn now to objections to clause (i) of the conceptualist stance. Most
objections to this clause turn on the supposed implausibility of the claim
that ordinary speakers know the axioms, rules, and theorems of linguistic
 Laurence (this volume), sect. 4. In sect. 5 he rejects other formsof arguments against
conceptualism, including others he attributes to Devitt and Sterelny.
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theories. They also tend to share a common form, asserting the existence
of some feature F such that both:
(a) F is an essential feature of knowledge,
and
(b) F is missing from the relation—the putative ‘knowledge’ relation—
that ordinary speakers bear to the linguistic theories purportedly
applicable to them.
Any true-making substituend for ‘F’ in (a) and (b)will mean that conceptu-
alism, at face value, must be rejected.
To illustrate, take the ascription of knowledge of the c(onstituent)-
command condition on polarity expressions:
A polarity expression must be c-commanded by an a·ective con-
stituent.
(Constituent X c-commands constituent Y i· X and Y are distinct, neither
dominates the other, and X is immediately dominated by a constituent that
dominates Y.) If we are free to suppose that adult speakers know this and
certain other principles, innately or otherwise, then we are in a position to
explain why they distinguish between (1) and (2), with the second being
deemed unacceptable (conventionally indicated with an asterisk):
(1) The fact that he has resigned won’t change anything.
(2) *The fact that he hasn’t resigned will change anything.
In (2), hasn’t is an a·ective constituent that, in contrast to won’t in (1),
fails to c-command the polarity expression anything. But acceptance of
this explanation requires that there be no feature F such that the relation
borne by ordinary speakers to the c-command condition lacks F whereas
 Radford (1997), 3.9, introduces the theory behind this condition using the example
in the main text.
 Strictly, what is unavailable is a non-free-choice reading of (2). There are acceptable
‘free choice’ readings of the same string that require stressing ‘anything’ or adding, say,
‘you care to mention’. Compare the di·erent readings obtained according to whether
‘any’ is stressed in ‘I don’t want any house’.
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knowledge requires F. Many regard as absurd the supposition that ordinary
speakers know the c-command condition.
John Searle, for instance, charges that the kind of knowledge attributed to
ordinary speakers by linguists is not available to consciousness and so is not
genuinelyknowledge.More recently,DeanPettit has suggested thatknow-
ledge must be possessed of a species of epistemic warrant that is missing
from the cognitive relation ordinary speakers bear to linguistic theories.
Other candidates for F, properties essential to knowledge but missing from
ordinary speakers’ linguistic competence, include: verbalizability,upsilonaspertilde concep-
tuality and rational integration, objectivity, and propositionality.upsilonasperacute
 Searle (1990); see also Dummett (1981) and the reply in Chomsky (1986). A slightly
di·erent set of challenges turns on the topic of knowledge of the content of one’s own
mind (‘self-knowledge’), particularly the properties of the expressions of one’s idiolect—
see Higginbotham (1998b) and Smith (1998).
 Pettit (2002); see also Nagel (1969). Chomsky talks explicitly of knowledge that is
unjustiﬁed in Chomsky (1976) and (1980).
upsilonaspertilde Quine (1970) objects to a lack of evidence for attributions of non-verbalizable know-
ledge. He has been widely criticized for inferring from this (alleged) lack of evidence to
the incoherence of such attributions. For more on this debate, as well as the notion of
an ‘extensionally equivalent set of rules’ that lies at its heart, see Laurence (this volume);
Stich (1971; 1972); Chomsky and Katz (1974); Root (1974); George (1986); Neale (1987);
as well as, in a more conciliatory mood, Quine (1975).
 The concepts that a speaker allegedly lacks—making it inappropriate for us to
attribute knowledge to them—can include concepts invoked only by language theorists,
such as the concept c-command or satisfaction by an inﬁnite sequence (Campbell 1982), aswell
as concepts expressed by words that the speaker can use despite only ‘partially grasping’
their ‘full meaning’, e.g. ‘carburettor’ (seeHigginbotham 1989b: sect. 3, and the papers in
pt. 3 of this collection for discussion). What lacking a concept in either category may be
taken to consist in is itself relatively open. It could be the failure of the putative knowledge
to integrate with the rest of their rational system through a failure to be ‘inferentially
promiscuous’; or it may be simply that it lacks the marks of intentionality in Bentano’s
sense, such as substitution failure or lack of existential import. For discussion relating to
one or other of these formsof the objection see Cooper (1973);Evans (1981);Stich (1983);
Higginbotham (1989a); Stainton (1996); Barber (1997; 1998); Higginbotham (1998a); and
Knowles (2000).
 George (1990), Higginbotham (1991), and Barber (2001) o·er di·erent attempts to
deal with the concern that, if what we know is constituted out of our knowing it, the
knowledge will lack objectivity. There is also a large literature coming at the problem
of objectivity via the topics of scepticism and rule-following, often using Wittgenstein’s
discussion in Philosophical Investigations and/or Kripke (1982) as a springboard. See Forbes
(1984); Chomsky (1986), 223–43; Wright (1989); and references in the useful survey
[See p. 10 for n. 18 cont. and n. 19.]
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One approach conceptualists could take or have taken to these objections
is to deny that the relevant F is missing from our relation to our language;
another is to deny that F is an essential feature of knowledge. Sometimes
making careful distinctionsmeans that both forms of response can be taken
at once. Regarding the need for knowledge to be consciously available,
for example, one could distinguish between access consciousness and phe-
nomenal consciousness. Knowledge is consciously accessible if it plays a
role in the subject’s wider cognitive life; linguistic knowledge is available
to the subject in this sense, as can be seen precisely from the role it plays
in linguistic behaviour. And wemay lack phenomenal consciousness of our
linguistic knowledge, but this form of consciousness is not essential to the
explanatory potential of knowledge attributions, and so can be regarded as
an inessential feature of knowledge.

Conceptualists have also responded by refusing to enter into discussions
of what is or is not essential to knowledge in the traditional philosophical
sense of the term, or even in its ordinary usage. Such a discussion, they
imply, would quickly degenerate into a pointless verbal dispute. What
matters when thinking about features listed as candidates for F is not that
they are essential to knowledge as conceived of by the folk or by Ren‹e
Descartes, but whether they are explanatorily essential. The refusal to get
bogged down in merely verbal disputes is crystallized in the popular move,
initiated by Chomsky, of abandoning the word ‘knowledge’ in favour of
some surrogate, to be thought of as a term of art, such as ‘tacit knowledge’,
‘competence’, ‘cognizing’, ‘representation’, or even simply ‘R’.
discussions by Hale (1997) and Miller (1998), ch. 5. Wiggins (1997) cites the possibility of
error as a reason to reject Chomsky’s (1995a) claims about linguistic knowledge.
upsilonasperacute Several critics of conceptualism (e.g. Harman 1968) have compared the attribution
of tacit knowledge of linguistic principles unﬂatteringly to the attribution of knowledge
of the principles of mechanics in the explanation of cycle-riding. Themoral of the analogy
is that linguistic principles describe what speakers know how to do, not something they
know propositionally (‘knowledge that’).

 See Block’s reply to Searle (1990) in the same volume, rounded out in Block (1995).
 See Chomsky (1980) and (1986), 267–8. Cognizing is stipulated to be the same
as knowledge but stripped of those features that stand in the way of using knowledge
attributions in psychological explanations in cognitive science. (Chomsky is also keen to
add that, although science is not bound to ordinary usage, as it happens ordinary usage
of ‘knowing’ is often closer to that of ‘cognizing’ than it is to traditional philosophical
deﬁnitions.) Searle (1990) objects to the practice in cognitive science of (as he sees it)
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This terminological man¥uvre has its place but hardly eliminates the
importance of reﬂecting on the character of the corresponding relatum.
After all, at the very least we are presupposing attributions of cognizing to
be explanatory, and for this to be the case there must be some explanatory
framework within which the attribution is embedded—one cannot simply
stipulate one’s way to an explanation. To what extent does letting go of
the word ‘knowledge’ (or equally, the word ‘belief’) signal an abandonment
of the associated explanatory framework, intentional explanation?
Georges Rey takes up this question in Chapter 5, where he attempts
to identify the explanatory framework at work in linguistics. The default
framework, he says, is standard computationalism, according to which
semantically evaluable entities—mental representations—are felicitously
transformed in computational processes, something that is possible because
these sameentities have causal properties in addition to their semantic ones.
Rey is highly sympathetic to this computationalist framework, and argues
that this is the framework within which linguistics must operate if it is to
operate at all. Given this, he is puzzled by anti-intentionalist claims made
by Chomsky (especially in Chomsky 2000) that, Rey believes, sit uneasily
with the appeal to computationist explanation.
Rey notes that at the heart of linguistics are appeals to intentional terms
such as ‘representation’, e.g. as embedded within the context: ‘level of . . .’.
Rey is interested in whether linguists’ use of this and other terms, either
in their practice or in their reﬂections on that practice, ﬁt with the role
representations are supposed to play within computationalist explanation
as it is normally understood. Some of the remarks made by Chomsky, for
example, can seem to be at odds with this role: ‘“representation” is not to
deﬁning one’s way to successful explanations by coining a special notion, cognizing, that
is just like knowledge save that is lacks anyof knowledge’s troublesome features; appealing
to inference to the best explanation in order to give this notion legitimacy widens the
diameterwithout removingthecircularity.SeeMatthews (1991) for discussionof inference
to the best explanation in this context. Philosophical discussion of tacit knowledge in
cognitive science more generally can be found in Fodor (1968), Graves et al. (1973), and
Crimmins (1992), as well as the literature cited parenthetically in n. 5 above.
 To say this is not to say that one should actually stop doing linguistics until one
has understood the nature of the explanation, as Searle (1990) seems to be suggesting
(see previous note). As Fodor (1981) remarks, one often comes to understand why an
explanatory strategy is legitimate long after one has taken it to be such.
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be understood relationally, as “representation of” ’. Chomsky repeatedly
rejects the relevance to naturalistic enquiry of intentional phenomena: ‘in-
tentional phenomena relate to people and what they do as viewed from
the standpoint of human interests and unreﬂective thought, and thus will
not (so viewed) fall within naturalist theory, which seeks to set such factors
aside’.Chomsky has o·ered his own interpretation of his apparent appeals
to intentionality in other places, saying that they are merely inessential ex-
pository devices. Rey, after seeking but failing to reconcile this hostitlity to
intentionality with the need to adopt the computationalist framework, con-
cludes that we should charitably overlook Chomsky’s anti-intentionalism
and take at least some of his uses of intentionalist discourse at face value.
The ﬁnal chapter of this section serves as a bridge to Part Two, which
focuses on speciﬁcally semantic knowledge. Robert Matthews (Chapter 6)
examines the adequacy of conceptualism in linguistics, focusing on refuting
an argument advanced by Jerry Fodor and Stephen Schi·er to the e·ect that,
whatever the truth about syntactic knowledge, attributions of knowledge
of truth-conditional semantic theories are unnecessary and empirically un-
motivated.
InRemnantsof Meaning (1987) Schi·er introduced thecharacterofHarvey,
who comes to know themeaning of utterances not by deploying knowledge
of a semantic theory, but by virtue of possessing a mechanism in his head
that takes sentences of Mentalese into other sentences of Mentalese. For
example, it might take
  , ‘   ’
into
      
(where an upper-case English expression is to be understood as refer-
ring to the Mentalese expression with the same content as the English
one). To e·ect this translation, there is no need to suppose that Har-
 Chomsky (1995a), 53. I o·er an interpretation of this particular claim in Barber
(2001).  Chomsky (2000), 22.
 Fodor (1976) and Schi·er (1987). For similar claims see Soames (1985) and (1989).
The Harvey example, introduced immediately below in the text, is discussed by Fricker
(this volume) and Lepore (1997).
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vey actually knows the axioms of a semantic theory, or even the relevant
theorems of such a theory (its ‘T-sentences’). The point of the example
is that ordinary speakers could be just like Harvey in terms of what is
going on in their heads, and so also just like him in not knowing the ax-
ioms or theorems of a semantic theory. Schi·er suggests that, for all the
empirical evidence we have available to us, this is not only possible but
likely.
Matthews rejects this conclusion by rejecting the assumption that some-
one like Harvey should be described as failing to know a semantic theory.
Under its most plausible reconstruction within the computationalist frame-
work, the knowledge relation is precisely one that Harvey could be said
to bear to a semantic theory: a semantic theory provides a speciﬁcation-in-
intension of the function computed by themechanism attributed toHarvey,
which takes Mentalese expressions into Mentalese expressions. To this ex-
tent, Harvey’s cognition certainly ‘involves’ a semantic theory. Matthews
takes it to be an open empirical question whether Harvey knows a semantic
theory, speciﬁcally its axioms, in some stronger sense than simply being able
to e·ect the pairing of utterances withmeanings/truth conditions speciﬁed
by the theory.
2 Understanding
Part One concerns the status of linguistics as a discipline, and the adequacy
of conceptualism. Rightly or wrongly, the content and category of the
linguistic theory that is ostensibly known/represented/cognized are often
treated as irrelevant to this debate. Part Two focuses more speciﬁcally
on semantic theories and their status. Two questions dominate: whether
semantic theories that attribute extensional properties such as reference,
satisfaction, or truth conditions to expressions can or should be married to
the conceptualist perspective; andwhat to make of the connection between
knowledge of meaning and linguistic understanding.
On the ﬁrst question, there is an interesting symmetry between Chom-
sky’s approach to linguistics andDonaldDavidson’s philosophy of language.
Chomsky, we have seen, treats theories in linguistics as objects of ordinary-
speaker knowledge; but he has long been sceptical of the agenda, popu-
lar among philosophers of language in the analytic tradition, of seeking
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to provide truth-conditional semantics for natural languages. Since 1967
Davidson has been a consistent advocate of this latter agenda; yet he has
equally consistently abstained from treating these theories as objects of
actual knowledge.upsilonaspertilde What they agree on is the claim that it is unwise to
assume that truth theories are objects of knowledge.
A move that has become popular in recent years is to fuse these two
perspectives—to psychologize Davidson and extensionalize Chomsky.
Those who take this approach regard extensional theories as objects of
knowledge, knowledge that partially accounts for our capacity to under-
stand one another through language. The case for this fusion is simple
enough: only if we were possessed of such knowledge could we have cer-
tain of the linguistic abilities that we do.
One abilitywehave is a capacity to intuit the di·erence between valid and
invalid arguments, a di·erence that seems to turn on the semantic structure
of the sentences out of which arguments are composed. Our sensitivity to
this structure depends, by hypothesis, on our having somehow internalized
the clauses of the relevant semantic theory.
Another ability is the capacity to assign truth conditions to utterances in
a systematic and accurate way. By supposing that a speaker has knowledge
of semantic clauses for the component expressions of an uttered sentence
and for grammatical concatenation, and then by granting her an ability or
disposition to carry out appropriate derivations, we can begin to see how
she could arrive at an appreciation of the truth condition of the utterance.
That phonological and syntactic knowledge alone fails to come close to
providing what is needed for understanding is obvious. In the following
passage, from the novel The Corrections by Jonathan Franzen, a boy is not
allowed from the family table until he has eaten his rutabaga and liver:
‘Dadmeans for you to sit there till you eat that. Finish it up now.Then yourwhole
evening’s free. . . . Noun adjective,’ his mother said, ‘contraction possessive noun.
Conjunction conjunction stressed pronoun counterfactual verb pronoun I’d just
upsilonaspertilde See Chomsky (2000), throughout; and Davidson (1967; 1990). Though Davidson is
sceptical of the value of embedding truth theories inside psychological operators, he is
not wholly explicit on the reasons for this reluctance. Soames (1956), esp. sect. 3, criticizes
the argument in the main text. Peacocke (1986) incorporates a reply to Soames (1985),
with Soames responding in the same volume; see also Soames (1989); (1992), 25.
 Structural validity is the cornerstone in Evans (1976), part of an early attempt to
psychologize Davidson (see Evans 1981 and the subsequent literature cited in n. 5 above).
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gobble that up and temporal adverb pronoun conditional auxiliary inﬁnite—’
Peculiar how unconstrained he felt to understand the words that were spoken to
him. Peculiar his sense of freedom from even that minimal burden of decoding
spoken English. (Franzen 2002: 261–2)
Toexplainwhy this is nothowit is for us,what isneeded, over andabove tacit
knowledge of phrase-structure rules, is tacit knowledge of a compositional
truth theory. That, at least, is what many have claimed.
At one time persuaded of the value of grafting Davidsonian semantics
onto Chomskian syntax, Paul M. Pietroski (Chapter 7) is now sceptical
of the value of extensional semantics. Pietroski is willing to grant that
speakers have a certain kind of thin semantic knowledge, su¶cient to
explain a far more limited range of semantic phenomena. Consider the
various contrasts within the following list (where a common subscript
index requires the words to be assigned a common referent, a distinct index
signiﬁes a distinct referent, and an asterisk indicates the unacceptability of
the string so interpreted):
(3) Rachel
i
knew she
i
would laugh.
(4) Rachel
i
knew she
j
would laugh.
(5) She
i
knew Rachel
j
would laugh.
(6) *She
i
knew Rachel
i
would laugh.
(7) Rachel
i
laughed at her
j
.
(8) *Rachel
i
laughed at her
i
.
(9) Rachel
i
laughed at herself
i
.
(10) *Rachel
i
laughed at herself
j
.
(11) She
i
knew Rachel
j
would laugh at herself
j
.
(12) *She
i
knew Rachel
j
would laugh at herself
i
.
The pattern of acceptability judgements associated with the di·erent inter-
 Larson and Segal (1995) draw together and develop various strands of the Chom-
sky/Davidson programme. See alsoHigginbotham (1985; 1986; 1988; 1992) andLaurence
(1996).Davidson’s work takes the syntax of the ﬁrst-order predicate calculus as its founda-
tion and adds to it as necessary. But once truth theories come to be regarded as embedded
within the mind of a particular speaker, this presupposition is unmotivated. Within the
new framework, work on sorting out traditional problems of opacity, reference failure,
the logical form of adverbs, and so forth is undertaken on the understanding that it must
ultimately gel with a syntax that is more likely to be Chomskian than Fregean.
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pretations of these strings can be accounted for by supposing that we all
know the c-command condition on binding:upsilonasperacute
A bound constituent must be c-commanded by an appropriate an-
tecedent,
that herself is a reﬂexive anaphor and so must take its reference from (‘be
bound by’) an antecedent expression by which it is c-commanded (9–12),
and that the pronouns her and she either need not or must not pick up their
referential properties in this way (3–8). Another ‘thin’ semantic phenome-
non is our capacity to distinguish readings of structurally ambiguous strings
such as (13):
(13) Visiting relatives can be tedious.
This capacity to disambiguate can be understood to reside in our possessing
the knowledge that leaves us the option of parsing in either of two ways.
Finally, there are certain judgementswemake about necessary connections,
inferences that seem to be analytic and/or a priori, that could be rooted in
the lexicon. The inference from (14) to (15) may serve as an example:
(14) John knows that he will survive.
(15) John will survive.

But such ‘thin’ semantic knowledge falls a long way short of allowing
the knower to interpret the sentences as a whole. For this, one must know
what ‘laugh at’ means, what ‘visiting’ means, and so forth, where this is
equivalent to appreciating how the appearance of these expressions within
any given sentence contributes to the truth conditions of that sentence. Or
so many have assumed.
Pietroski challenges the assumption, using as a springboard the scepti-
cism Chomsky and others have voiced about extensional semantics as a
contribution to any properly scientiﬁc study of language. His argument
upsilonasperacute See Radford (1997), 3.9, and Chomsky (1995b), 1.4.2 (co-author Richard Larson).

 See Jackendo·(1990) for discussionof the interpretationof this kindof phenomenon.
 ‘Fat syntax’ would perhaps be a better label, but it has been used already by Stich
(1991) in a di·erent context.
 The others include Hornstein (1987; 1988; 1989; 1995) and McGilvray (1998). For
discussion and further references see Ludlow (2003).
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distils down to the complaint that truth conditions are an ‘interaction ef-
fect’, the motley product of many di·erent factors. This means not only
that judgements about truth conditions cannot be systematized in a com-
positional theory, but also that it is not worth our trying to systematize
them in this way. He accepts that there can be systematicity in semantics;
but he denies that we should interpret ‘’ (or ‘T’) in systematic semantic
theorems:
(16) . . . is  i· . . .
as ‘true’. It might just as well be left as it is. Systematicity gets you a theory
of -conditions; things only get messy in the move from -conditions to
truth conditions.
The idea can be made vivid using an example found in Chomsky (1986:
44). He notes various cases of what we might pre-theoretically label as
‘referential dependency’, such as the contrasting adequacies of (17), (18),
and (19):
(17) John
i
thinks that he
i
is intelligent.
(18) He
j
thinks that John
i
is intelligent.
(19) *He
i
thinks that John
i
is intelligent.
These can be explained using binding principles seen already in connection
with (3)–(12), in particular the rule that a pronoun must not be bound by
an item that c-commands it. But exactly the same phenomenon seems to
appear even when the relevant noun phrases fail to refer:
(20) Joe Public
i
thinks that he
i
is intelligent.
(21) *He
i
thinks that Joe Public
i
is intelligent.
(22) The average man
i
thinks that he
i
is intelligent.
(23) *He
i
thinks that the average man
i
is intelligent.
This suggests we should not describe the phenomenon as being about
reference after all. To this example we might add that of Bob Dole, an
unpopular Republican candidate for the US presidency in 1996. Dole was
fond of referring to himself in the third person: ‘Bob Dole won’t raise
taxes’, and so forth. Disrespectful commentators were given to violating
the binding principles needed to rule out (19) by uttering sentences like (24):
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(24) (?) No one wants Bob Dole
i
to win; even he
i
doesn’t want Bob Dole
i
to win.
Odd though it is, all names and pronouns in (24) are used to refer to the same
person. Troublesome cases (20)–(24) and others like them can be sidelined
by dropping the assumption that the term ‘refers’ in ‘co-refers’ is to be taken
as full-blown reference in the pre-theoretic sense, something that people do
in acts of communication in all its complexity, not a property of expressions
as such. ‘Co-referring’ could instead be interpreted as ‘co-indexed’, where
indexing has something to do with reference, but not necessarily something
that we can (or should want to) spell out in detail.
Instead of resting at the level of thin ‘quasisemantics’ and talking of the
‘r-relation’ instead of the ‘reference relation’ (Chomsky 1986: 44; 1995b:
1.4.2), one could attempt to hold on to a face-value interpretation of ‘refers’
by confronting these and other examples using technical solutions that,
as tends to happen, invoke ever more elaborate hidden syntactic machin-
ery. Pietroski prefers to conclude that, since semantics is whatever our
best theory of semantics is about, and our best (most progressive) theory
of semantics is not about extensional properties but about their thinner
counterparts, the extensional approach should be dropped for the white
elephant it is.
An ongoing debate about richness of syntax serves to link Pietroski’s
paper with the next contribution, from Reinaldo Elugardo and Robert M.
Stainton (Chapter 8). When someone utters (25):
(25) I haven’t had breakfast,
 Positing hidden syntax to deal with supposedly semantic problems is remarkably
widespread among philosophers of language, often worryingly so: for example, to cope
with the problem of deference to what is in fact gibberish R‹ecanati (1997) suggests that
we silently quantify over languages; and Forbes (1997) posits hidden logophors in replying
to the problem of apparent opacity in the absence of any opaque operators (see Saul 1997
and Barber 2000).
 Two interesting points for discussion here are, ﬁrst, the extent to which this last
argument relies on the principle found in Devitt and Sterelny (1989) and criticized by
Laurence in this volume (see pp. 6–7 above); and second, how Pietroski’s position com-
pares with that of Wilson and Sperber (2002), who also argue for a downgrading of the
theoretical interest of truth conditions in favour of relevance conditions, though their
concern is that truth conditions are insu¶ciently sensitive to the context of use.
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we do not default to the interpretation that at no point since the dawn of
time has the utterer had breakfast. But this distinction is not marked in the
overt syntax. So either we should give up the attempt to tie this feature of
the default interpretation of the sentence to its syntax, or we should posit
hidden syntax. If the latter option is tempting, it becomes less plausible as
a strategy the more endemic the problem is seen to be.
(26) I opened three tins of beans.
(26) is, by default, interpreted as being true when and only when the utterer
opened exactly (or at least) three tins, but rarely as being true just in case
she opened at most three tins. Yet there are contexts when an at-most
interpretation would be appropriate. Should we posit hidden syntax to
explain this? Where is this syntax? In the language module? Is it innately
speciﬁed?upsilonaspertilde Assuming that answers to these questions are not forthcoming,
and that this is a reason to worry, we might be tempted—in keeping with
the proposal by Pietroski—to shield the syntax from some proportion of
the myriad of factors that enter into determining truth conditions, treating
the process whereby the jump from syntax to truth conditions is achieved
as having one or more of the following features: not part of the language
module; pragmatic not semantic; ad hoc; unsystematic; unworthy of our
seeking to systematize it.
The connection to Elugardo and Stainton’s chapter is that the surface
incompleteness of (25) and (26) can be treated as of a kind with the more
radical surface-incompleteness phenomenon they address: non-sentential
assertion. To borrow an example of theirs, when Andrewwalks into a room
uttering:
(27) From France
while wiggling a box of cigarettes in his raised hand, we are happy to regard
his utterance as true or false according to whether the box of cigarettes is
 Thus one might argue that the present-perfect tense form means the sentence is
referring to an ‘extended now’, so that it is encoded in the sentence that it is true only if
a past event of having breakfast and the utterance itself both occur within this extended
now.
upsilonaspertilde For discussion see Stanley (2000); Borg (forthcoming); Cappelan and Lepore (forth-
coming).
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from France. Yet there is no sentence to interpret. Or at least there is no
sentence on the surface, and there are good reasons for not positing hidden
but determinate syntax such as:
IP
DP I{
(28) Det N{ Inﬂ VP
This N PP pres. sing. be
box of cigarettes
to combinewith (27) so as to deliver up a complete interpretable sentence.
So the task of getting from the uttered fragment of language to the propo-
sition expressed cannot be fully captured in a compositional truth theory,
since compositional truth theories operate on syntax and there is no more
than a subsentential fragment of syntax available in this case.
Elugardo and Stainton address the following question (among others): if
the proposition expressed by (27) is not arrived at through the interpretation
of a partially hidden sentence, how is it arrived at? They outline the options
before plumping for a particular answer on more or less empirical grounds.
Drawing on recent work on visual cognition they suggest that the uttered
subsentential language fragment combines with descriptive and indexical
referring terms of Mentalese to yield a fully propositional formula of Men-
talese whose content is the proposition expressed by the utterance. The
principles at work to make this happen felicitously will be pragmatic rather
than semantic. If their solution is adequate for these radically incomplete,
 The case against the ‘elliptical sentence’ view is summarized by Elugardo and
Stainton in the present volume, but see also Stainton (2000).
Created on 9 September 2003 at 10.07 hours page 20
 . 21
non-sentential cases, it would seem to carry over to the incompleteness
apparently endemic even in the utterance of whole sentences.
In what became known as the ‘modesty’ debate that took place in the
1970s and 1980s, Michael Dummett and John McDowell disagreed over
how far semanticists owe an explanation of what knowledge by a native
speaker of English of the semantic propositions expressed in (29) and (30)
must ‘consist in’ if its attribution is to deliver an account of understanding:
(29) ‘Snow’ refers in English to snow.
(30) ‘Snow is white’ is true in English i· snow is white.
Dummett claimed that modesty in the elaboration of what knowledge
of reference or of truth conditions consists in turns semantic knowledge
into something trivial, something a non-competent speaker could learn in
a book without having the faintest understanding of ‘snow’. What is to
prevent my being said to know that ‘snow’ refers to snow merely upon
reading the letters s-n-o-w in a book and so realizing that such a word
exists? To answer this we need a ‘full-blooded’ account of what knowledge
of reference conditions consists in. Against this McDowell claimed that, in
an account of linguistic understanding, nothing need be added beyond the
modest claim that semantic clauses express what is known.
The debate in that context had to do with Dummett’s rejection of global
realism(onwhich see furtherAlexanderMiller’s contribution inChapter 15),
but it is a debate that takes place upstream of that controversy. Even though
they each keep away from the metaphysical debates that once drove the
interest in the question, the authors of the next three chapters are all
concerned with how knowledge of semantic clauses relates to linguistic
understanding.
Stephen Schi·er (Chapter 9) begins to address the question of what
it is to know the meaning of an expression by noticing some di¶culties
facing what, approached naively, are initially attractive answers. One of
these answers is that to know the meaning of an expression e is to have the
propositional knowledge that emeans that such-and-such. Another is that it
is to bepossessed of a certain knowledge-how.A succession ofmodiﬁcations
 Dummett (1975), 101–2, 108; (1976); McDowell (1980); and McDowell (1987) plus
Dummett’s reply in the same volume. Higginbotham (1989b), sect. 3, defends a position
that resembles McDowell’s in its modesty.
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in response to the shortcomings of these and other proposals leads him to
the opinion that for someone to know what an expression means in a
given language is for her to be in a state that plays a certain role—called
the knowledge-of-meaning role—in the information processing that takes one
from a perception of the utterance of a sentence containing the expression
to knowledge of what was said in that utterance.
This raises the question of what processing role the knowledge-of-
meaning role for an expression, complex or primitive, might be. Roughly
speaking, Schi·er holds that it is an information-processing state that di-
rectly or indirectly represents the expression as linked with what Schi·er
calls its character*, which, again roughly speaking, is Schi·er’s replacement
for David Kaplan’s notion of character (Kaplan 1989). Along the way, Schif-
fer also argues that, while expressions do indeed have meaning, there may
not be any things that are the meanings of expressions.
Chapters 10 and 11 turn from the understanding of expressions to the
understanding of utterances. They also trade in notions that, for all their
importance in traditional epistemology, tend to be conﬁned to the back-
ground in discussions in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, if they
ﬁgure at all. In Chapter 10 Elizabeth Fricker is concerned with justiﬁcation;
in the following chapter I am concerned with the objectivity of knowledge.
Fricker’s focus on justiﬁcation may appear beside the point, a traditional
philosopher’s misplaced concern with an explanatorily inessential feature
of knowledge which is of no interest to theoretical linguists. But a broader
perspective ought to dispel this impression. Epistemologists have always
striven to understand how the various possible routes to knowledge—
perception, memory, a priori knowledge, inference, and so forth—could
deliver opinions towhich we are epistemically entitled. One such (putative)
route to knowledge is testimony. Much of the literature on testimony turns
on the nature of trust, expertise, and authority of sources, on whether we
should attach credence to reports of miracles, defer to scientists in public
policy, and so forth. But a comprehensive theory of testimony will need also
to include an account of howwe come to understand the utterances we are
called on to trust. From this perspective, a concern with justiﬁcation lies at
the core of the topic of linguistic knowledge. Our capacity to communicate
with one another is an astonishing epistemic achievement, every bit as
startling as, say, our capacity to perceive other features of the world around
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us. (Indeed, allowing us to communicate is just one among several respects
in which possessing a language is to our epistemic advantage.) Leaving
justiﬁcation out of the picture on the grounds that it is inessential to the
explanation of linguistic competencemisses something crucial: thatwehave
an epistemic right to our linguistic judgements is one part of what we are
trying to explain.
One could adopt a reliabilist line on the nature of this justiﬁcation,
insisting that all the epistemic entitlementweneed is provided by ourminds’
reliably tracking the truth (regarding what our interlocutors are saying, for
example, or regarding what the normal state of I-languages among salient
adult speakers is). But simple reliabilism must face up to well-known dif-
ﬁculties that even most epistemological externalists recognize.upsilonasperacute Fricker’s
application of this dialectic to the linguistic domain is therefore welcome,
as is her attempt to develop a notion of understanding that respects these
broader lessons.
Fricker defends a view that treats understanding an utterance as the ex-
ercise of a quasi-perceptual capacity. Like Schi·er in the previous paper, she
notes that merely knowing what a person has said is insu¶cient for under-
standing what that person has said. (For example, A may know through an
interpreter what B has said, and yet fail to understand what she has said.)
What explains this deﬁcit, she proposes, is that understanding must come
through a characteristic form of experience, grounded in a reliable mecha-
nism for the achievement of representations of the content and force of an
utterance. But though reliability has a role to play, the key component of
her account of understanding is a theory that has explicit a¶nities with the
claimmade by JohnMcDowell thatmoral competence is a quasi-perceptual
capacity.

In the ﬁnal contribution to Part Two (Chapter 11), I seek to establish both
the need for and the availability of an intention-based account of the truth
conditions of utterances. The need is driven by another consideration at the
heartof traditional epistemology:objectivityof subjectmatter. Abelief or an
upsilonasperacute See e.g. Conee and Feldman (1998).

 McDowell (1985); McDowell himself proposes to think of understanding as a kind
of perception in McDowell (1977), 165–9, and McDowell (1980). Hunter (1998) reaches
a similar conclusion and also stresses the relevance to understanding of justiﬁcation, as
does Lepore (1983).
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instance of knowledge is objective only if the condition for its correctness
is independent of the fact of our holding that belief or possessing that
knowledge. Resignation to the non-objectivity of our linguistic knowledge
is not an option, since the subjectivity of our linguistic knowledge is hardly
compatible with its manifest usefulness in understanding what others have
said. Objectivity may seem to call for a realm of semantic facts that is so
constituted as to be independent of themental states of individual speakers:
we are wrong when we depart from the norms governing some salient
linguistic community. Against this conclusion I argue that for semantic
knowledge to be objective—for it to possess the requisite independence
of subject matter—we must treat the truth conditions of utterances as
inherited from the intention out of which those utterances are performed
(and not from expression meaning of a kind that ﬂoats free from each
utterer’s intentions).
I then defend an account of the form of the relevant intentions. The
intention on the part of the utterer that determines the truth condition
of a given utterance is the intention to be recognized as performing an
action with that truth condition. The notion of ‘recognition’ requires some
chiselling before this suggestion becomes plausible. And it turns out that
once this chiselling is ﬁnished, recognizing is equivalent to understanding.
This fact connects my paper to the two preceding ones, since all three of
us have as a subconcern the existence of a distinction, alluded to above,
between knowledge of meaning on the one hand, and understanding on
the other. Schi·er, Fricker, and myself all agree that there is a distinction to
be drawn but di·er, superﬁcially at least, in where we locate the source of
this di·erence.
3 Linguistic Externalism
The papers in Part Three are concerned with linguistic externalism, cen-
tral to over three decades of debate in the analytic philosophical tradition.
Externalism is amultifaceted topic, relevant inmore than oneway to episte-
 This much is argued for in Barber (2001) and merely summarized in the present
paper. Other discussions of objectivity are cited in n. 18 above.
 For more discussion of the topic of understanding and knowledge of meaning,
see Dummett (1975; 1976); Peacocke (1976); Campbell (1982); Heck (1995); and Hunter
(1998).
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mology of language. One way of trying to frame the discussion is in terms
of the F-schema introduced above in Section 1. Critics of conceptualism
have often sought to ﬁnd features that are essential to knowledge but miss-
ing from the relation we supposedly bear to linguistic theories. Is there a
troublesome feature that can be generated out of externalist intuitions?
Consider the thought that the extension of our term ‘water’ is H
2
O,
in part because of facts about our environment (speciﬁcally, that the stu·
we happen to refer to when using the term has, to a close approximation,
H
2
O as its chemical composition). This does not seem to be compatible
with treating the extensional properties of our terms as a function of our
knowledge states. After all, for a speaker to know that the extension of
‘water’ is H
2
O is for her to know a lot more than we would normally feel
entitled to attribute to her on the basis of her linguistic competence.
It is true that many people today could be said to know the chemical
composition ofwater. Butwhat about thosewho lived beforeCavendish and
others showed, in the late eighteenth century, that water had a compound
structure? Did these people’s use of the term have a di·erent extension?
Intuitively not.Did they in fact know that theywere referring toH
2
O?Again
intuitively not. Shouldweattribute to themonly theweaker knowledge that
‘water’ refers to water? Maybe, but this attribution appears to su·er from
being in one way or other unﬁt for our purpose, too modest to account for
speakers’ capacity to avoid speaking about superﬁcially indistinguishable
colourless liquids every time they use the term ‘water’. Perhaps we can
make a distinction between reference and a technical notion, semantic
value, where it is knowledge of the latter that determines extension. But
this is a promissory note until we are told more about what knowing the
semantic value of a term amounts to.
Alternatively, we could leave the content of pre-1770 semantic knowledge
untouched but regard it as a special kind of knowledge. But this does
not seem a promising strategy for conceptualists to adopt either. Such
knowledge would be very di·erent from the tacit knowledge we ostensibly
 The two classic statements of content externalism are Putnam (1975) and Burge
(1979). Moreover, Burge (1989) argues that semantics can be ‘a social phenomenon’
without this fact jeopardizing the conceptualist position that ‘the study of language is a
part of individual psychology’ (p. 174). Larson and Segal (1995), ch. 13, provide a useful
introduction to the topic of how externalism relates to conceptualism. See also Dummett
(1991), ch. 4; Lycan (1986); and Peacocke (1994).
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have of, say, the c-command condition on polarity items. Tacit knowledge
plays a role in our cognitive processes, even if it does so unconsciously.
The special knowledge pre-1770 speakers of English had of the semantic
relation between ‘water’ and H
2
O was not only unconscious, it played no
cognitive role at all. This is in considerable tension with the individualist
aspirations that typically lie behind conceptualist thinking. Linguistics is no
longer a branch of individualist psychology if itmust consider an individual’s
physical and social environment before it can identify the content of the
theory supposedly known by speakers.
These reﬂections hint at a potential substituend—‘being internal’—for ‘F’
in the schema. But the incompatibility (if there is one) between externalism
and conceptualism arises more naturally, not through the isolation of an
objection to ﬁt that schema, but as a challenge to conceptualists to formulate
a policy towards the externalist intuition that ‘meaning ain’t in the head’, a
policy of either reconciliation or rejection.
Chomsky’s attitude towards twin-earth thought experiments is dismis-
sive. He describes the intuitions allegedly mined from the entertainment
of these scenarios as folk intuitions with no more than sociological inter-
est, belonging to ‘ethnoscience’, speciﬁcally to the study of folk linguistics,
where the folk in this case are late twentieth-century analytic philosophers.
This is apparent, he suggests, in the way our intuitions about reference are
contextually determined, and only occasionally accord with the essential-
ism that ties reference to chemical composition. We can be interested in
externalist intuitions about reference as part of a sociological investigation,
but wewould bemistaken to subscribe to them ourselves in the expectation
that doing so will contribute to a natural science of language.
Those wishing to defend conceptualism in the extensional sphere cannot
simply replicate Chomsky’s dismissal of externalist thought experiments,
which is part and parcel of his rejection of extensionalist semantics in its
entirety. The three discussions that make up Part Three of the present
book help us to understand the options available to those who wish to
reconcile externalism with the reality of semantic knowledge, narrowing
down the possibilities in some areas and opening them up in others, often
in unexpected ways.
 Chomsky (2000), ch. 5. For discussion of whether thought experiments have any
role to play in sciences other than linguistics see Gendler (1998).
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Probably the most unexpected is contained in Chapter 12, by Peter Lud-
low.Hediscusses externalismwith regard to a linguistic property other than
semantic content, askingwhether itmight not beworth regarding the logical
form of an utterance as sensitive to facts about the physical environment.
To the extent that di·erences in logical form can a·ect content, this carries
implications for content externalism. But advocates of content externalism
usually take content to be directly dependent on external circumstances,
unmediated by any di·erence in logical form; logical form is tacitly as-
sumed to remain unchanged. So Ludlow’s proposition that a di·erence in
the extra-cranial world can a·ect the logical form of an expression is a
radical one.
Defending his 1905 account of the logical form of quantiﬁed noun
phrases, Russell pronounced that a philosophical theory could be assessed
according to how many problems it solved without generating new ones
of its own. The same can be said for the proposal that logical form has the
potential to vary according to external factors. Ludlow considers possible
applications of the idea, the most striking of which deals with the capacity
of proper names to be usedmeaningfully in the absence of any referent. The
so-called problem of non-referring singular termsupsilonaspertilde has proven to be one
of the most intractable in semantics. And most philosophies of mind face a
clearly related conundrum: how it is possible for us to think about objects
that do not exist. It is not often that a wholly new perspective emerges
in this area. Ludlow is well aware that his suggestion risks creating more
di¶culties than it disposes of, and his conjecture should be taken in that
spirit. But here, in brief, is how externalism about logical form could help.
Suppose that, were they to have a Russellian logical form, utterances
involving non-referring proper names would present no semantic problem.
 Di·ering conceptions of logical form can be found in a recent collection of essays
edited by Preyer and Peter (2002).The possibility of externalism about logical form raises
the possibility that still other properties could depend on the speaker’s environment.
Chomsky (2000), 129, 177, lampoons talk of semantic value by introducing a parallel
notion, phonetic value, noting its lackof theoretical value, and asking his reader to explain
the relevant di·erence between the twonotions. In the light of Ludlow’s example, itwould
be interesting to reﬂect on whether phonetic form could ever usefully be regarded as an
externalist notion, and if not why not.
upsilonaspertilde My hesitancy in accepting the label has to do with a preference for the view that it is
peoplewho refer, using language to do so. By this score, all singular terms are non-referring.
I ignore this consideration in what follows.
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Uses (in this world, now) of (31) and (32)would both be false, for a common
reason: the emptiness of the domain of an existential quantiﬁer belonging
to the utterance’s logical form.
(31) The king of France is bald.
(32) Santa Claus is bald.
Suppose, moreover, that there are Kripkean reasons against assigning ut-
terances containing referring proper names a logical form that treats them
as disguised deﬁnite descriptions. Granting these two suppositions, what
is to stop us assigning the complex Russellian logical form to utterances
containing non-referring proper names, and a simple non-Russellian logical
form to utterances containing proper names that successfully refer? This
would require treating logical form as externally determined, sensitive to
the existence of a denotation. But it would also clear up a lot of di¶culties.
Awkward questions come thick and fast, as Ludlow is willing to ack-
nowledge. They turn mostly on the consequence that we could be radically
ignorant of the logical form of our utterances. There is an already familiar
sense in which we cannot know the logical form of our utterances in the
traditional, Cartesian sense of ‘know’: logical form on any conception is
unconscious, embedded at a level deep within our thought or our brains.
That is why it takes a Russell or an entire empirical discipline to reveal it. But
the lack of knowledge countenanced under Ludlow’s envisaged solution is
of an altogether di·erent order: facts about logical form would depend on
facts ﬁxed outside the head. Limits to our powers of introspection could
never account for our failure to know whether there was ever a real Moses.
One of the more bizarre apparent consequences of externalism about
logical form is that whether an inference is valid would not always be
something we can realistically know, since validity can depend on logical
form and we can be radically ignorant of facts that determine logical form.
Indeed, validity threatens to depend on contingent matters of fact. Ludlow
raises these questions before asking to what extent they are simply special
cases of the widely recognized tension between self-knowledge and exter-
 There are variouswaysof ﬂeshingout the basic idea inRussell (1905),with the theory
that quantiﬁednounphrases refer to generalized quantiﬁers havingwidest currency today
(see Neale 1990; Larson and Segal 1995).
 Kripke (1980); see also Soames (1998).
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nalism about content (which is not to diminish their critical signiﬁcance), or
whether externalism about logical form gives rise to wholly newworries.upsilonasperacute
Gabriel Segal’s contribution is orthodox in its concern with content
rather than logical form, but is no less provocative than Ludlow’s. He
o·ers an argument for an internalist position that is radically holistic in
the following sense: no term—e.g. ‘tiger’—can have the same content for
di·erent individuals if there is a sentence—e.g. ‘Tigers are indigenous to
Africa’—over which they disagree.
The argument works only for a certain species of content—cognitive
content—that satisﬁes the following ‘Fregean’ principle of discrimination:
two terms in an individual’s idiolect will di·er in such content whenever
substitution of one for the other in an extensional context would lead that
individual to withdraw assent. But he points out at the beginning of the
paper that such ﬁne-grained content is needed for us to make sense of
equally ﬁne-grained di·erences in behaviour. Lois Lane does not touch up
her make-up when she hears ‘Clark Kent is coming to lunch’; yet she does
when she hears ‘Superman is coming to lunch’. Explaining this di·erence
requires assigning di·erent content to her terms.

Segal is persuaded by his own argument that cognitive content is radically
holistic, but acknowledges the di¶culties holism brings in its wake. For this
reason, the paper can be thought of as throwing down a challenge to anyone
who is persuaded—like Segal himself—by the arguments for the existence
of cognitive content.
One consequence of holism that is particularly relevant to the present
volume is its apparent incompatibility with our knowing themeaning of the
expressions in our language. If nothing else, this would seem to threaten the
conceptualist stance on semantic theory that Segal also happens to favour.
The threat arises as follows. We do not suppose that the meanings of our
words change every time we undergo a change of belief. Yet if holism is
right, ourmeanings, like our beliefs, are in continual ﬂux.Does thismeanwe
do not know what our words mean? Segal carefully isolates some di·erent
senses in which we can and cannot be said to be ignorant of meaning—
upsilonasperacute For work on the tensions between self-knowledge, a priori knowledge, and regular
(content) externalism see McKinsey (1991); Brown (1995); and the essays in Ludlow and
Martin (1998).

 Braun (2001) criticizes this argument.
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alleging that these di·erences have been glossed over by Burge (1988) and
others—and evaluates their relative importance.
Jessica Brown (Chapter 14) takes issue with Segal’s starting point: the
need to hypothesize a species of content satisfying the Fregean criterion
of content individuation, as opposed to working entirely and solely with
a social externalist notion wherein contents are partly individuated by the
practices of a linguistic community. Indeed, the main burden of her paper
is to argue against those who, like Tyler Burge, try to combine social
externalism with a Fregean notion of content.
Brown’smain argument against thewisdomof adopting a Fregean notion
of content if you are an externalist is that externalism is committed to
sameness of content being potentially opaque, something that undermines
the main motivating argument for adopting the Fregean notion. Sameness
of content is potentially opaque if it is possible for someone not to realize
that two of her terms express the same concept. That social externalists
are committed to this is fairly clear: I could fail to realize that ‘guillemot’
and ‘murre’ both refer to the same species of auk, yet they have the same
content according to social externalists, because their content is tied to the
identical use to which British and Canadian experts (respectively) put the
terms. And granting this opacity undermines the classic Fregean argument
for sense. The failure of Lois Lane to put together the respective contents
of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ in inference and in behaviour can be put
down to her ignorance of their sameness of content, rather than to an actual
di·erence in content.
4 Epistemology through Language
Most discussion of linguistic knowledge in Parts One to Three focuses in
oneway or another on the nature of the relation holding between speakers/
hearers and their language. The two papers in Part Four travel beyond this
agenda, asking what reﬂecting on our epistemic relation to language can
tell us about other topics in philosophy, speciﬁcally in epistemology.
Philosophy of language was once burdened with the task of dissolving
the traditional philosophical problems by showing how they resulted from
confusion about language. Most philosophers todaywould concur that this
was harmful to philosophy; most philosophers of language would add that
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it was especially harmful to the philosophy of language. Bad linguistic so-
lutions to genuine philosophical concerns often depend on questionable
claims about language. Because language is a challenging and interesting
enough phenomenon in its own right, the strategy of approaching philo-
sophical problems through language as a matter of routine is showing few
signs of a renaissance.
This is quite compatible with the practice of carrying over lessons learnt
in thinking about language to other domains, and indeed of seeking out
linguistic solutions to a philosophical problem where speciﬁc reasons exist
for thinking this is an appropriate strategy. The papers reviewed so far are
replete with instances of lessons of the ﬁrst kind; the two papers in this
section are concerned with more direct attempts to draw epistemological
conclusions from independently plausible linguistic claims.
InChapter 15AlexanderMiller examinesoneof several arguments against
semantic realismthathavebeendevelopedbyMichaelDummett andothers,
reviewing the current state of the debate before o·ering his own reasons
for rejecting the argument.
Semantic realism is committed to theview thatunderstanding statements
consists in knowing or ‘grasping’ their truth conditions, where truth, here,
is to be thought of as potentially evidence-transcendent. The acquisition
 Gellner (1959) was an early opponent of the ordinary-language movement. Grice’s
1967 lectures ‘Logic and Conversation’ (in Grice 1989, esp. essay 2, pp. 22–40) were a
landmark for their contribution to our understandingof the di·erence between semantics
and pragmatics, and to the analysis of the notion of meaning. This fact sometimes
overshadows its originally intended purpose,whichwas to undermine the use of ordinary
language as a beacon with which to approach various philosophical problems.
 Three papers illustrate the potential and variety of applications for epistemology
of lessons drawn from linguistic theory: Davidson (2001) argues that there are limits
to sceptical possibilities that spring from the possibility of interpretation; Dwyer (1999)
applies poverty-of-the-stimulus reasoning to the case of moral knowledge, outlining a
kind of principles-and-parameters moral psychology that explicitly parallels the linguistic
case. And Botterell (forthcoming) follows Stainton (1998) in rejecting Russell’s principle
of acquaintance—crudely, that one can think about something only if one is in someway
directly acquainted with it—because of its incompatibility with non-sentential uses (see
ch. 8 of the present volume) of quantiﬁed noun phrases.
 Other arguments against semantic realism include the manifestation argument
(which Miller discusses and responds to in this chapter since it is pertinent to his rejection
of the acquisition argument) and the normativity argument. See the introduction to
Wright (1986a) for an overview.
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argument against semantic realism turns on the alleged impossibility of
our ever being able to acquire understanding of this kind, at least for those
fragments of language that can be used to make evidence-transcendent
claims. The alleged problem is that acquiring an understanding of language
involves being trained in its correct usage, and we cannot be subjected to
such training for evidence-transcendent portions of language since we can-
not possibly be exposed to deﬁnitively correct usage. (Rejection of semantic
realism would be compatible with continuing to think of understanding in
terms of grasp of truth conditions; but the relevant notion of truth would
need to be epistemically constrained.)
A tempting reply to this argument is that the training needed to provide
uswith an understanding of our language could take place using statements
that are subject to conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation. With that understand-
ing in place, nothing stands in the way of making claims that, though not
subject to conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation, are still comprehensible in the
realist’s sense: our understanding of these statements consists in appreci-
ating what conditions must be met for the statements to be true, even if
we can never in fact tell whether these conditions are met. Miller considers
the virtues of this and related responses, as well as several variants of the
acquisition argument, before rejecting it even in a far weaker form than it
was originally intended to have.
It is not immediately clear what to make of the relation between an
assumption at the heart of the acquisition argument, that language com-
prehension is a rational achievement, and thecontrastingviewthat language
acquisition consists, not in a rational process of hypothesis formation and
conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation, but in the largely unreﬂective maturation
of an innately speciﬁed language module, triggered and to some extent
shaped by a particular linguistic environment. The ‘data’ in this environ-
ment, looked at rationalistically, underdetermine the adult languages of
every actual speaker. Since we in fact acquire understanding in circum-
stances that would not enable a rational investigator to do so, why assume
that acquisition must, in principle, be rationalistically viable?
While this consideration may serve to undermine the acquisition argu-
 Antony (1997) uses this Chomskian claim about language acquisition to argue for
the irrelevance of rationally reconstructing linguistic competence after the fashion of
Foster (1976) or Wright (1986b).
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ment, it is not obvious that it does so. For one thing, poverty-of-the-stimulus
arguments are more plausible in the theory of the acquisition of syntax (or
‘thin’ semantics in the senseof Section 1, above) than they are for extensional
semantics. There is a healthy debate on the extent to which the range of
concepts available to us is innately speciﬁed, but the implications of this for
the acquisition of semantic knowledge are by no means settled. Second,
to the extent that innate knowledge is acquired by a species, it may well be
possible to replay the acquisition argument at a species level rather that at
the level of an individual organism.
James Higginbotham’s contribution (Chapter 16) has more positive
claims to make about the way reﬂection on language can yield epistemo-
logical conclusions. He is interested in so-called de se knowledge (roughly:
‘knowledge of self’) and in judgements that are immune to error through
misidentiﬁcation, though his claims about the logical form of gerundive
complements and related constructions will be of interest in their own
right.upsilonaspertilde
De se knowledge, if there is such a thing, is that category of knowledge
manifest in the contrast between these two scenarios:
A is watching a police raid taking place live on television; he believes
(correctly as it happens) that he himself is the person shown sitting on
a sofa inside the targeted house.
B is watching a police raid taking place live on television; he does not
believe (what is in fact the case) that he himself is the person shown
sitting on a sofa inside the targeted house.
Higginbotham is interested in the ways in which the contrast between A’s
and B’s predicaments can be marked in our language, in a variety of ways:
(33) (a) A expects that he will be arrested (true).
(b) B expects that he will be arrested (true under at least one read-
ing).
(34) (a) A expects that he himself will be arrested (true).
 See Cowie (1999) and the extensive reaction, for example.
upsilonaspertilde Contemporary discussion of these and related topics begins with Casta~neda (1966)
and Shoemaker (1968), usefully collected along with later work in Brook and DeVidi
(2001).
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(b) B expects that he himself will be arrested (false under all read-
ings).
(35) (a) A expects himself to be arrested (true).
(b) B expects himself to be arrested (false under all readings).
(36) (a) A expects PRO to be arrested (true).
(b) B expects PRO to be arrested (false under all readings).
What allows (33b) to be read in such a way as to tolerate B’s relative
ignorance, when no such reading is available for (34b), (35b), or (36b)?
Higginbotham argues that the emphatic reﬂexive, the reﬂexive, and PRO
respectively receive a special ﬁrst-personal interpretation, an interpretation
that is only optionally available in (33b).
Being immune to error through misidentiﬁcation is a property of states
such as my being in pain. I may wonder whether it is pain rather than re-
pressed pleasure that I am feeling; but I cannot wonder whether it is really
me who is feeling the supposed pain. This phenomenon has preoccupied
epistemologists at least since Sydney Shoemaker coined the contagious
phrase ‘immunity to error through misidentiﬁcation’ in 1968; before him it
provokedWittgenstein into claiming, characteristically, that only confusion
about language would lead a person into thinking that some especially
robust evidence lies behind the knowledge we have of our mental states.
Higginbotham is hardly committed toWittgenstein’s view that philosophy
occurs only when ‘language goes on holiday’; but he does think that lin-
guistic considerations can shed considerable light on this phenomenon.
Higginbotham claims that what underlies immunity to error through
misidentiﬁcation is a peculiar feature of perceptual states: when someone is
in them (in pain, say), what she is in is the state of thinking that the subject
of these very states is in them (i.e. in pain). This understanding of what
underlies immunity to error through misidentiﬁcation receives support in
the way it gels with Higginbotham’s account of what distinguishes (33)
from (34)–(36). The key is his observation of a curious fact about gerundive
complements. PRO constructions can be used to give voice to attitudes
 PRO =the understood subject, with no phonetic realization.
 Wittgenstein (1958), sect. 304, writing about our knowledge of pain, says of pain
sensation that ‘it is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that
a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.We
have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.’
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that are immune to error through misidentiﬁcation in certain gerundive
complements, even though the parallel use of reﬂexives fails to do so—still
less the parallel use of a simple pronoun. This is manifest in the fact that
(38) seems to follow validly from (37), even though (39), like (40), does not.
(37) I remember someone saying that John should ﬁnish his thesis by
July; my colleagues assure me that I was the one who said it.
(38) I remember my saying John should ﬁnish his thesis by July.
(39) I remember me myself saying John should ﬁnish his thesis by July.
(40) I remember PRO saying John should ﬁnish his thesis by July.
Higginbotham is led to suspect that ‘the problems of the de se, immunity to
error through misidentiﬁcation, and the rest, call for a solution in terms of
logical form’, and makes a number of claims about logical form with this
design in mind.
In this introduction I have glossed over the fact that contributors diverge
from one another as much in methodologies and ambitions as they do over
speciﬁc theses about language. Sometimes this divergence is explicit in a
claim about how to do e·ective science; sometimes it is implicit in the use of
a reasoning style that departs in some respect from the commonly acknow-
ledged norms of naturalistic enquiry. Epistemology of language is unlikely
ever to become a tightly circumscribed ﬁeld of study. Much of this discrep-
ancy can be put down to di·erences between traditions and disciplines.
But another factor is that epistemological issues are always tangled up with
ontological ones. How knowledge of language is possible is bound to turn
on what the object of knowledge is, yet there is a paucity of agreement on
what expressions are, what languages are, andwhat it is for them to have the
properties they do. An optimal ontology is probably more readily available
for the epistemology of language than it is for the epistemology of either
morality ormathematics, also characteristically human domains. But if this
is so, it does not show up in anything that could be called a consensus on
ontology in the chapters that follow.
Despite all this, themes that recur throughout the present volume add
to the integrity already implicit in works listed in the References below.
Irrespective of whether one agrees with their conclusions, the contributors
reshape and advance the ﬁeld here dubbed ‘epistemology of language’ by
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addressing issues that are absolutely basic in linguistics, in philosophy of
language, and in epistemology.
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